What makes universities and colleges attractive targets for cyber criminals?

[S1:Ep7] - In this episode, Smita Jamdar speaks to Mike Wills, Director of Strategy & Policy at cyber security company CSS Assure about the serious threats universities and colleges face and what they can do to protect themselves from cyber-attacks.

Find out more about our education team here.

Find out more or get in contact with our education team here.
See all of our other episodes here.

Transcript

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Smita Jamdar: Welcome to going further and higher Shakespeare martino's podcast in which we discussed topical, or indeed long running things in higher further education.

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Smita Jamdar: My name is sweet agenda and i'm partner and head of education here at Shakespeare Martino.

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Smita Jamdar: And in today's episode we're discussing a subject that conspires to be topical long running difficult and important all at the same time and that's cyber security.

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Smita Jamdar: Luckily, to make sense of it all i'm joined by my colleague Mike wells Mike is director of strategy and policy as our sister company CSS assure which specializes in advising on managing risks relating to cyber and data.

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Smita Jamdar: So Mike the last just survey of the sector, which came out at the end of last year, highlighted a number of really interesting things about the sectors relationship with cyber security and.

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Smita Jamdar: Firstly, it was clear that the majority, but not all of those responding sorry, it is a key risk and a strategic priority.

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Smita Jamdar: And secondly, despite this, the majority weren't confident that they were handling it all that well and and, thirdly, I think it was recognized that the measures.

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Smita Jamdar: That were needed to manage it could be seen as quite complex and expensive so from your point of view, what do you think makes universities and colleges such an attractive target for cyber criminals.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Well, good morning sweet, so thank you so much for inviting me to join us today so because, clearly, one of my favorite subjects so.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: i'm delighted to be able to talk to you and your listeners on this.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: and the first thing i'll start off by saying is cyber security is now in life skill and it's pervasive across our whole world, so not just.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Business or education or universities or higher education, further education but us as individuals and as a really important point alone we shouldn't compartmentalize this we should realize that it would affect us in every day in shapes and forms, we still don't do realize I don't recommend.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: But in order to answer your question is really important to understand what motivates cyber criminals and, at the end of the day, they are criminals, including the title, they want.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: A payday from this otherwise there's no point in doing this they're not doing it out of the goodness of their heart they're here to get a transaction.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And because of that universities are highly attractive targets opportunities to them for a number of reasons.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Firstly, there's a significant amount of people that whether that our students or the teaching or the Faculty staff support and admin staff, the donors, be it.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: You know supplies and for the company, whether people there's personal data, whether it's personal data there's opportunities, because cyber criminals can steal that.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And then they can sell it on the dark web and other cyber criminals can get hold of it, and we can start to use that.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: To target individuals through identity theft may be or other things, so people is the fundamental interest to cyber criminals.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Then there are other opportunities there as well, when you consider the amount of research on the and the intellectual property.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: That are developed in university that's highly attractive again, because this is the cutting edge of technology, or you know future commerce and criminals recognize that that.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: is valuable to someone so again, it often comes back to criminality and theft so they're very interested in getting in there and.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: and stealing that information and then either again sending it on the dark web to the highest bidder, or you know they might be doing it to undermined.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: The individuals that are doing it all, for having an effect, you know potential stock price or something like that in the markets if it's found out that you know high profile companies developing something.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And all of a sudden that ips be breached, so that there are numerous threads and it's it's it's often not simple Simon can was going to do this to achieve that they can often be many, many layers.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And then the last one I would I would suggest it's interesting to them is um you hear a lot now about ransomware ransom is all about holding people to ransom an education and higher education, particularly it's a hugely competitive, as we know, globally, not just in the UK.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: and reputation is everything, and particularly in this Kobe title postcode air one would hope.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: The ability to deliver virtually all within your learning environment is fundamental.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: To what universities do now, if a cyber criminal can disrupt that or stop you from being able to operate in the way that you need to to deliver your value proposition.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Well, they can hold you to ransom for that, and you know, universities, potentially won't want to damage the reputation, they need to be back to deliver as quickly as possible.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And there may be cases where they choose to pay that ransom because they've just got to get back to normal operating as quickly as possible.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Again, cyber criminals know that so there's I mean there were many things, but there's sort of three key points about you know why universities or education institutions are of interest to them decide.

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Smita Jamdar: That we're not, I think that's incredibly helpful because it sort of makes it.

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Smita Jamdar: Much easier to understand if you're a specialist in the cyber area when you start thinking about well it's obvious in a way they've got the data they've got the people there, their asset rich from the point of view of.

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Smita Jamdar: Cyber criminal, so what why wouldn't they attack them and you talked about ransomware.

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Smita Jamdar: yeah and you know and again.

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Smita Jamdar: Just survey, I think, highlighted that that's something that seen by the sector is a real risk at the moment I know we've seen some live examples of this over.

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Smita Jamdar: The last couple of years, but what other kinds of cyber threats, you know, apart from ransomware what else should universities be worried about if in this area.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: I mean there is it's like working in a talk shop or workshop, there are many tools to do a job and.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: a really important point to note is this a cyber attack is not the end state it's not the aim is a digital tool it's a.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Digital rock for a winder or digital crowbar to get you X it gets you access to do something and they tend to be for things that are cyber criminals after they ought to do their motivations they want money.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: we've already talked about they want to create mischief because they can because it's a way of demonstrating ego or credibility or a building a name of an industry.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: They want to create mayhem and you know define you may have it could be either you look at the wanna cry, which is the cyber attack they hit the.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: NHS that created mayhem and they can do, and the last one is there might be a military context and let's not get into what's happening in the group at the moment, but that these tend to be the full context where cyber attacks are used.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And there are many different tools, you can do it so ransomware is just a process of locking you out of your system.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: You come in the morning you turn in desktop your laptop in your peril and you want to be able to use it, all of a sudden.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: It either doesn't come on or there's a smiling skull or any number of images that they're saying you know only goodness knows how many bitcoins if you want to get back in.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: But how they get to that point they need access and the only way they can get access it by going to infiltrate or penetrate the system.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And that can be done in a number of ways that can be done by very clever people dealing with code manipulating and seeing if there's any.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Vulnerable points in what we call the architecture, the way that a system that digital system of digital portal might have been built.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And they can look to exploit gaps and things cyber securities it doesn't go away or cyber resilience, you know you what you might have had a patch Thursday out on the Internet, you know when apple sends out or window sends out patches they're doing it for a reason.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Because they were found a vulnerability and so just.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Point please make sure you, you know, everybody at home and at work you're doing that because we don't touch that there's a there's a whole there's a vulnerability.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And I use the example with clients a lot when you go to bed at night, you make sure your front door is locked and your windows closed and not viewing security it's the same field digital systems if they're not maintained we forget about things you leave doors and windows open.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And that means that cyber criminal can come in and do something.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: So it can be a direct attack using you know coding and clever stuff.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: or it could be through phishing emails we would heard about phishing emails and.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And you know, there are hundreds of thousands of access points to an institution they only need to be successful, once.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And we all sit there and say i've had phishing emails I can I know that at night they're not you know they're laughing or they're credible, but that but that's not the case, there are laughing incredible ones, but you know cyber criminal gangs, in particular, this is organized crime.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And they have business plans and.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: strategies and budgets and resources and all of these things which they can use to.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: To develop these products really credible females mainly working with a client and maintenance had their website completely closed.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: it's a high identical, and you know, one of the things we're working out with them, so why have they done that what is their motivation what's the strategy for doing that because.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: You don't do that unless they have a plan.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Because always just a waste of time and effort, and so you know with phishing emails you know they can be so credible.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: That anyone anyone, you know the greatest cyber security practitioners could be tracked and if you're having a bad day you're rushing you're hung over God, for better or whatever it takes one click.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: You know, we have to be lucky every single time so I can release the lucky ones, and then, if you consider how many people email him from home into work, email into the network of the system, thousands of thousands of people every single one of them.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Is a potential opportunity for cyber criminal to get it, you know so that's I mean that's fishing, and you know it's about manipulation of people.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Now we could get into coercion, you know we talked about espionage and coercion here, you know people will build target packs on individuals if there's a very specific piece of intellectual property, they want you know they will go after it.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: and humans are infallible everyone has weaknesses and and you know this is this is back to spy games and and and such like, where people will look for weakness and individuals, and it does happen.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Is their data is their gambling is there.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Other things, how can what money can I dangled if you do this for me I plug this into here or do that for me i'll do that you know here's a payday an incident they've got access.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And it might sound far fetched it might sound James Bond the kings money all of that sort of thing, but it really does happen.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And again, there are many tools.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: I wouldn't want to explain all of them, most of them come for a human being.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Quite line up to that hope that was you.

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Smita Jamdar: know I can what What was really interesting as you were talking was, I was reminded of the fact that last summer the QA and just put out a.

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Smita Jamdar: bullet in about contract cheating and its relationship with cyber security.

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Smita Jamdar: and cyber crime, and I think it was just as you were talking it struck me that there is so much that you've given examples of that is a real life issue for hire and further education so.

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Smita Jamdar: What the QA Bulletin said was that, based on research done in America in Australia sorry not America.

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Smita Jamdar: And they'd found that sal so these people that you paid to write essays for you.

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Smita Jamdar: were putting Code into university websites, so that students will automatically redirected to their websites and perhaps believed that it was you know, a legitimate thing to do.

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Smita Jamdar: That once those students that then been drawn into using the services, some of them were them being blackmails either just for money or presumably given what you've just said, they could then be used as being blackmail, so that you can get access to.

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Smita Jamdar: Its other information.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: As such a complex web and the layers in this are again there was grand strategy at play here, the organizations that do this are incredibly.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: forward thinking, and you know you've hit the nail on the head there so.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: cheating, you know cheating and unfortunately education has has always been a thing, but the challenge now.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: is exactly as you say how people can be exploited because of a website is cloned you know, a student potentially goes there thinking it's about think they've put in their personal details and put in their information.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: You don't know just by going to that website, whether the criminals actually turned on your web camera.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: and your webcam is now you're now being recorded during these end up potentially because when you when you click a link or when you go to a URL unless you're 100% certain about the you know the domain address the URL.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Actually, what you're doing you're in a particular licks and email you're hitting an execution button.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And we look at and say it's a blue piece of text which is underlined and it says it's going there but doesn't always mean it's there you could be you could be executing malware.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Down onto your computer spyware and stuff of that you know you just wouldn't know because you got the skills to do it.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: But I think you know I can absolutely see, as you said, if they've gone to a spoof site, the harvest data so that's a day one, they can sell the personal data, the individual.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: payday to now they have access to a person's attending an institution or a business that's potentially.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: available in terms of an access point we can manipulate that payday three could be coercion of subversion as we've just spoken about how how could they be used for could just be payday for could just be bribery of the individual.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Because they carried out something and all sudden their their future is in jeopardy, because of you know they've carried out an act which is you know illegal or you know cheating or when all of those things so it's so I mean I guess the next question is, what can you do about it well.

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Smita Jamdar: It was exactly wisdom say listen to that it made me want to you know turn everything off go into a bunker never imagined sort of basically communicate by way of carrier pigeon, which is clearly not that not the solution so yeah what can we do about it.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Well, I think the first point to say is we're already living in that in this world, so you know, hopefully for 95 90% of people were surviving okay at the moment.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: But we can always do more, and you know, as I said, I can't say enough to everyone, cyber resilience is now a life skill, you have we have to understand that we are living with this, and this is about being disciplined.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Okay it's very easy to is not working on slow wisest lives click this or i'm in a rush or whatever don't do that.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: You know, because if you're at home if.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: If you lost the keys to your front door of your House, or you thought someone had had had got them and we're exploiting those key you would change your locks right.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: yeah just saying, I think the password to login site as a digital key if you thought someone had your digital key if you use your analogy of your home, you would change your kids and your locks.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: should change your passwords and stuff like that, so the point is, we you know we're living with this at the moment, what we need people to understand to be hard to hack.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: that's what you're worth it, because you know, unfortunately, there is no, there is no perfect solution, because if you've got enough money enough time and enough expertise.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: A successful cyber attack can occur, but understand that we're dealing with criminality and criminals do not want to get caught, because then it's been time President that's not fun.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: You know, and so actually they're going to say how can I achieve what I want to achieve in the quickest way without exposing myself and expose myself essentially get caught so that that is a motivation that's really important to understand.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: So if you are harder to hack unfortunately than 7080 90% of anyone people that that criminal will probably go elsewhere.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: it's the same for universities again unless there's a particular piece of research going on day one.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: If one university it's harder to happen, the other they're going to go after the other one because 100,000 student records from one or whatever it's 10,000 student records from one university or the other doesn't matter you know still money that can be monetized so.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: You know the.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Universities will deliver particular staff and i'm not entirely sure about students but.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Some do will do cyber awareness things, but you know what people going out and other courses on border will do is once a year, you know and sometimes it can be paying lip service to.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And you know I can't remember either three weeks ago, let alone if i'd done a course six months ago, you know what what does it mean, and I think it needs to be a mindset to say you know.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: you've got to be disciplined in this, because you protect your home you protect your bank accounts and stuff you've got to realize this is all now and interconnected.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: So I think one it's just staying aware and again, as you know, three shakes the MIT CSS we've got a whole regime of education tutorials where we're trying to.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: make people understand their resilience and and become a heart attack so i'd say that's really, really important.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And there's an individual responsibility, as well as an organizational responsibility because, again, particularly as a university, you have to understand that your students are a vector of attack against you.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: yeah so you can't just go well it's not my problem if that they're doing that, actually, you have obligation or responsibility to say well i've got to help these people.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Be more as it is because, in effect, it protects me so this ultimately comes down to having a really.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: Good comprehensive program of resilience of cyber resilience to make sure that you know, because sometimes people do one thing or the other, and now it's great, but actually when you when you when you straight from one area system that presents a weakness in that area, so it's.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: About you know, so we would always suggest having going to credible supplier to come in to do a cyber resilience assessment.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And that's done against regulatory frameworks internationally regular regular regulatory frameworks.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: A best practice have been developed over the last you know 10 1520 years and benchmark yourself, where do we get out what are we not good at.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And then you can have a roadmap for remediation and make sure it's right, and no one has the money right now to pay for this.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: You know, and the time or the other, because there's so many transformational programs going on.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And, but at least you've got a plan, or at least you can then say right now we can forecast, now we can budget now we can build a program that education, you can do that can go on our roadmap.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: And, God forbid that information is stolen, and you have to go to the information commissioner's office.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: and say look this this has happened it's much better to say we've had this, but you know what we were trying to do something about it and here's the steps that we've taken rather than going oh yeah kind of knew it was a threat, but you know we're busy and.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: We didn't have much money and so again, there are many reasons to do and again since this show can help with that if people needed to be.

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Smita Jamdar: Great I mean Mike Thank you very much, because what you've done there is make something which I think a lot of us.

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Smita Jamdar: know about in the abstract, I think, quite comprehensible and quite practical and that's I think great so thank you very much for that.

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Smita Jamdar: And thanks very much to all of you for listening and we hope you'll join us next time so don't forget to hit the subscribe button and, if you like, what you've heard, please do leave a review for now it's goodbye for me and.

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CSS Assure - Mike Wills: it's goodbye, for me, thank you for having.